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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1712 
_____________ 
 
MICHELLE ROCHE,  
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, 
                                                                                            Appellant 
v. 
 
AETNA, INC.; AETNA HEALTH, INC., A NJ CORP; 
AETNA HEALTH INSURANCE CO;  
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE, CO; RAWLINGS, CO  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey                                                            
District Court No. 1-13-cv-03933 
District Judge: The Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 6, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 9, 2017)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
                                                   
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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Aetna Life Insurance Company (“Aetna”), a health care plan administrator, 
took the position that Michelle Roche, a plan member, had to reimburse it for 
medical expenses it paid on behalf of Roche under the relevant benefits plan.  
Roche reimbursed Aetna but then filed this action, contending that she should not 
have had to reimburse Aetna.  The District Court concluded that, before filing this 
action, Roche needed to exhaust her administrative remedies.  On appeal, Roche 
argues that she was not required to exhaust those remedies.  Because the plan 
unambiguously requires Roche to exhaust her remedies, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
I 
Roche is a member of two health care benefit plans: an employee-group 
health plan sponsored by Bank of America (“the Bank of America Plan”) and a 
governmental health plan funded by the State of New Jersey (“the State Plan”), 
collectively (the “Plans”).  The administrator of both Plans is Aetna.1  The 
Rawlings Company (“Rawlings”) is Aetna’s reimbursement claims vendor.   
On January 19, 2007, Roche was injured in a car accident in Pennsylvania.  
Between 2008 and 2010, the Plans provided Roche with $88,075.29 to cover 
medical expenses for her accident-related injuries.  She received $1,473.57 from 
                                                   
1 Roche also sued Aetna Inc., Aetna Health Inc., and Aetna Health Insurance Co. 
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the Bank of America Plan and $86,601.72 from the State Plan.  From 2010 to 
2012, Rawlings sent Roche, through her personal injury attorney, notices 
informing Roche of her purported obligations under the Plans’ terms regarding 
Aetna’s right to recover the medical expenses it paid on Roche’s behalf in the 
event she received a settlement.  Roche eventually recovered money via settlement 
from the tortfeasor involved in the car accident.  On January 4, 2013, Roche’s 
personal injury attorney sent Rawlings a check for $88,075.29 as reimbursement 
for the amounts paid by the Plans for Roche’s accident-related injuries.   
II 
On May 28, 2013, Roche commenced the present case in New Jersey state 
court.  Then, on June 25, 2013, Defendants removed the case from New Jersey 
state court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d).  On August 1, 2013, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment 
under Rule 56 or, in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In 2014, the District Court ordered 
limited jurisdictional discovery and dismissed Defendants’ motion without 
prejudice to refiling post-discovery.  Following jurisdictional discovery, 
Defendants renewed their motion.   
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On February 29, 2016, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the action without prejudice.  Roche v. Aetna, 
Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 180, 190 (D.N.J. 2016).  The District Court reasoned that 
Roche had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and that exhaustion was 
not futile.  Id. at 185–90.  Roche then timely appealed.   
III2 
We review grants of summary judgment de novo.  See Cat Internet Servs., 
Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 333 F.3d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 566 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002)).  “Summary 
judgment was proper if, viewing the record in the light most favorable to [Roche], 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and [Defendants] are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Id.  We exercise de novo review when examining the 
applicability of exhaustion principles to a plaintiff’s claim but review a decision as 
to the futility of exhaustion for an abuse of discretion.  See Harrow v. Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Am., 279 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2002).   
                                                   
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and 
supplemental jurisdiction over Roche’s individual claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because, although the District 
Court dismissed the action without prejudice, Roche stood on her complaint by not 
attempting to avail herself of the administrative process.  See Ghana v. Holland, 
226 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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IV 
This case focuses solely on the State Plan because Roche only brought 
claims under “non-ERISA governmental health insurance policies” and the Bank 
of America Plan is an ERISA-governed plan.3  A152–58.  Roche conceded as 
much in the District Court.  See Roche v. Aetna, Inc., 13-cv-03933, Doc. 35 at *5 
n.2 (D.N.J. September 20, 2013) (“Plaintiff is only seeking damages arising from 
Defendants’ subrogation lien and/or reimbursement demand for benefits paid 
under the State Plan.”).  We conclude that the State Plan required Roche to exhaust 
her remedies before filing in court. 
A 
ERISA exempts the State Plan from its coverage.  Specifically, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1003(b)(1) exempts from coverage those employee benefit plans that are 
“governmental plan[s].”  ERISA defines “governmental plan” as “a plan 
established or maintained for its employees by the Government of the United 
States, by the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any 
agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(32).  The 
State Plan is a plan established by the State of New Jersey, specifically through the 
State Health Benefits Commission (“the Commission”), and it is therefore exempt 
                                                   
3 “ERISA” is an acronym for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974. 
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from ERISA’s requirements.  A240–52; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-17.25 et 
seq.  
The State Plan “is, in effect, the State of New Jersey acting as a self-
insurer.”  Burley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 598 A.2d 936, 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991).  Aetna administers the State Plan and “makes payments on 
claims on behalf of the State.”  Id.; see also Neuner v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of New Jersey (In re Lymecare, Inc.), 301 B.R. 662, 674 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
Nov. 5, 2003) (observing that the State Plan “is administer[ed by] the 
[Commission] through contracts with several insurers . . . , under which the insurer 
provides the administrative services necessary to effectuate actual delivery of 
health care benefits and the payment of claims for benefits”).  “The claims must, 
however, be authorized by” the Commission.  Burley, 598 A.2d at 937.  The 
Commission also has the power to develop rules and regulations regarding the 
State Plan.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-17.27.  Those regulations are found in New 
Jersey Administrative Code § 17:9-1.1 et seq. 
The regulations governing the State Plan specifically address claim 
exhaustion.  In relevant part, the regulations state, “Any member of the [State 
Plan] who disagrees with the decision of the carrier and has exhausted all appeals 
within the plan . . . may request that the matter be considered by the Commission.”  
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N.J. Admin. Code § 17:9-1.3(a).  The regulations go on to describe how the 
Commission will handle appeals.  Id.  The regulations thus contemplate 
administrative appeals within the State Plan followed by appeals to the 
Commission prior to filing in court.   
B 
The State Plan also describes its process for appealing decisions made by 
Aetna as the plan administrator.  First, the State Plan describes appealable 
decisions by Aetna as “adverse benefit determinations.”  A247.  “Adverse benefit 
determinations are decisions Aetna makes that result in denial, reduction, or 
termination of a benefit or the amount paid for it.”  Id.  The State Plan also lists 
typical reasons for an adverse benefit determination.  Id.  Those reasons include, 
but are not limited to, ineligibility or lack of coverage under the State Plan.  Id.   
The State Plan further outlines the procedures following an adverse benefit 
determination:  
Aetna will send [the plan member] written notice of an adverse 
benefit determination.  The notice will give the reason for the 
decision and will explain what steps [the plan member] must take if 
[he or she] wish[es] to appeal.  The notice will also tell [the plan 
member] about [his or her] rights to receive additional information 
that may be relevant to the appeal.  Requests for appeal must be made 
in writing within 180 days from the receipt of the notice.  
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Id.  Following Aetna’s notice, the State Plan “provides for two levels of appeal, 
plus an option to seek external review of the adverse benefit determination” by the 
Commission.  Id.  The Plan member “must complete the two levels of appeal 
before bringing a lawsuit against the plan.”  Id.   
In addition to outlining its appeals procedures, the State Plan provides Aetna 
with the discretion to exercise a “right of recovery.”  A250.  This right gives 
Aetna, as plan administrator, the authority “to recover from, and be reimbursed by, 
[a plan member] for all amounts th[e] Plan has paid” should a plan member, like 
Roche, “receive[] any payment from any [responsible tortfeasor] . . . as a result of 
an injury.”  A251.  To protect that right of recovery, the State Plan also provides 
for a right to “automatically” place a lien on any settlement related to an injury for 
which the State Plan paid benefits.  Id.   
C 
Given the above regulations and plan terms, the State Plan required Roche 
to exhaust her administrative remedies when Aetna made its adverse benefit 
determination.  Under the State Plan, adverse benefit determinations are certain 
decisions by Aetna requiring exhaustion of an appeals process prior to filing a 
lawsuit.  As described earlier, an adverse benefit determination is one “that 
result[s] in denial, reduction, or termination of a benefit or the amount paid for it.”  
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A247; see also N.J. Admin. Code § 17:9-1.3(a) (“Any member of the [State Plan] 
who disagrees with the decision of the carrier and has exhausted all appeals within 
the plan . . . may request that the matter be considered by the Commission.”).   
Here, Aetna provided Roche with approximately $88,000 to cover her 
medical expenses following an accident.  Roche then reached a settlement entitling 
her to compensation for her accident-related injuries.  Exercising its right of 
recovery under the State Plan, Aetna decided to request reimbursement for the 
amount paid to cover Roche’s medical expenses after her receipt of settlement 
proceeds.  That decision by Aetna is unquestionably one that results in the 
“reduction . . . of a benefit [to Roche] or the amount paid for it [by the State 
Plan].”  A247; see also M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Transp., 794 A.2d 141, 
152 (N.J. 2002) (“Generally, the terms of an agreement are to be given their plain 
and ordinary meaning.”); Burley, 598 A.2d at 940 (applying New Jersey contract 
law to state benefits plan).  Therefore, because Roche has yet to exhaust her 
administrative remedies as was required by the State Plan’s terms, she must do so 
before returning to court. 
Bolstering this conclusion are several of our cases interpreting when a claim 
is for “benefits due” under ERISA plans.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  A civil 
action under ERISA may be brought when a claim seeks “to recover benefits” due 
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to the plan member under the terms of the relevant plan.  Id.  In Levine v. United 
Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005), we held that claims by ERISA 
plan members to regain certain benefits after reimbursing their plan for those 
benefits were claims for “benefits due” under ERISA.  Id. at 161–63.  Following 
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, we reasoned that such claims were contesting a 
decision denying benefits under the ERISA plan and therefore akin to challenges 
to decisions administering benefits.  Id. at 163; see also Arana v. Ochsner Health 
Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“As it stands, [the plan 
member’s] benefits are under something of a cloud, for [the plan] is asserting a 
right to be reimbursed for the benefits it has paid for his account.”); Singh v. 
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[The plan 
member’s] claim to recover the portion of her benefit that was diminished by her 
payment to Prudential under the unlawful subrogation term of the plan is no less a 
claim for recovery of a plan benefit under § 502(a) than if she were seeking 
recovery of a plan benefit that was denied in the first instance.”).  As a result, in 
Levine, we concluded, “[The plan members’] claim [was] for benefits due.  [They] 
have already paid back a portion of their benefits.  Thus, they claim essentially that 
they are entitled to have certain health insurance claims paid under their ERISA 
plans.”  Levine, 402 F.3d at 163.  
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We reaffirmed Levine’s reasoning in Wirth v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 469 
F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2006).  The plan member in Wirth argued that his claim to 
recover money paid to reimburse a plan administrator was not a claim for benefits 
under the plan.  Id. at 308.  Citing Levine, we held that the plan member was 
actually seeking “benefits due” to him.  Id. at 309 (citing Levine, 402 F.3d at 163).  
In sum, we stated: 
Here, as in Levine, the actions undertaken by the insurer resulted in 
diminished benefits provided to the [plan members].  That the bills 
and coins used to extinguish Aetna’s lien are not literally the same as 
those used to satisfy its obligation to cover [the plan member’s] 
injuries is of no import—“the benefits are under something of a 
cloud.” 
Id. (quoting Arana, 338 F.3d at 438). 
While these cases address language from ERISA and not from New Jersey 
law, they are persuasive because of similarities between ERISA and the State 
Plan’s terms.  ERISA, like the State Plan at issue here, requires administrative 
exhaustion of claims following an “adverse benefits determination.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1; see also Harrow, 279 F.3d at 252 (“We apply the exhaustion 
requirement to ERISA benefit claims . . . .”); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 
800 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Except in limited circumstances . . . , a federal court will not 
entertain an ERISA claim unless the plaintiff has exhausted the remedies available 
under the plan.”).  Also like the State Plan, ERISA regulations define an adverse 
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benefit determination as “[a] denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to 
provide or make payment (in whole or in part) for, a benefit.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 2560.503-1(m)(4)(i).  Therefore, as an ERISA plan member’s attempt to regain 
money that the member reimbursed to a plan must be administratively exhausted 
under ERISA, a functionally identical claim under the State Plan must also be 
administratively exhausted before the State Plan member files in court. 
Given the plain terms of the State Plan requiring exhaustion, New Jersey 
regulations requiring exhaustion, and analogous ERISA case law supporting our 
reading of the State Plan, we conclude that Roche needed to have exhausted her 
administrative remedies before filing in court. 
D 
Roche presents several arguments attempting to explain why she did not 
need to exhaust her administrative remedies.  Each argument is unpersuasive.4  
Roche first argues that Levine and Wirth are “inapplicable” here because 
those cases are ERISA cases.  Blue Br. 13–14.  In doing so, she fails to identify 
any meaningful distinction between the claims and plans in those cases and her 
own.  Focusing on the text of the State Plan, Roche also contends that (1) 
reimbursement occurs “after the ‘coverage’ issue has already been resolved and, as 
                                                   
4 Because we conclude that Roche needed to exhaust her administrative remedies, 
we do not address Aetna’s alternative arguments for dismissal.   
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such, [reimbursement] cannot effect [sic] the extent, nature or provision of 
insurance”; (2) the State Plan’s “separate” right of recovery section “does not 
provide for administrative review” and so no exhaustion was required; and (3) the 
placement of an automatic lien on settlements demonstrates that the State Plan 
“did not intend for appeals” of Aetna’s decisions to seek reimbursement.  Blue Br. 
16–17.  Simply put, those arguments are not supported by the text of the State Plan 
and do nothing to undercut the State Plan’s plain language that a decision by Aetna 
requires exhaustion when it “result[s] in denial, reduction, or termination of a 
benefit or the amount paid for it.”  A247.   
Roche further observes that Aetna failed to comprehensively follow the 
State Plan’s terms by not providing notice of appeal procedures.  Blue Br. 18.  She 
argues that a particular ERISA regulation extinguishing exhaustion requirements 
in the absence of notice should apply to the State Plan.  Gray Br. 2–3 (citing 45 
C.F.R. § 147.136).  While Roche may be correct that Aetna gave no notice of the 
State Plan’s appeal procedures, she fails to explain why we should apply an 
ERISA regulation to the State Plan and why that ERISA regulation would apply 
given that the State Plan payments here occurred between 2008 and 2010 but the 
regulation covered, at the earliest, plan years “on or after September 23, 2010.”  
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating 
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to Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,364 (July 23, 2010).  
Although we earlier analogized to our case law interpreting ERISA, a similar 
analogy is unpersuasive here for a simple reason: neither the State Plan nor New 
Jersey law contains the language found in the ERISA regulation Roche cites or 
includes other language extinguishing the exhaustion requirement in the absence 
of notice.  See A247; N.J. Admin. Code § 17:9-1.3.  Finally, Roche was in 
possession of the appeal procedures and offers no reason for why she could not 
have appealed other than her mistaken belief that no adverse benefit determination 
had been made.  Thus, given the lack of any State Plan term or New Jersey 
regulation waiving exhaustion and Roche’s possession of the appeal procedures, 
the initial lack of notice of those procedures did not extinguish the State Plan’s 
exhaustion requirement. 
Roche also offers a series of five arguments that broadly challenge the 
application of an exhaustion requirement to her claims.  First, she contends that 
exhaustion “was intended to provide an appeal mechanism whereby medical 
professionals could evaluate” benefits determinations.  Blue Br. 19.  Roche offers 
nothing to support her assertion that review by medical professionals is the only 
purpose of exhaustion.  She also provides no explanation for why that general 
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purpose for exhaustion requires us to ignore the plain terms of the State Plan and 
New Jersey regulations requiring exhaustion.  See M.J. Paquet, 794 A.2d at 152.  
Second, she argues that claims of “across-the-board” errors were not meant to be 
exhausted.  Blue Br. 20.  This argument is unpersuasive because Roche points to 
no “across-the-board” policy by Aetna in deciding to exercise its right to recovery.  
Third, she states that, even if ERISA applies, we should not require exhaustion “as 
[a] matter[] of the Court’s inherent adjudicatory power and of the policy 
underlying exhaustion.”  Blue Br. 23.  Roche again provides no support for that 
conclusion.  Fourth, according to Roche, exhaustion does not apply to questions of 
law and the issues presented here involve “only a question of law.”  Blue Br. 23–
24 (citing cases).  This argument fails to account for the State Plan’s terms.  This 
case squarely involves Aetna’s decision to seek reimbursement, which is one that 
resulted in the “reduction . . . of a benefit [to Roche] or the amount paid for it [by 
the State Plan]” and one that required exhaustion under the State Plan.  A247.  
Neither Roche’s brief nor the cases she cites provides support for the proposition 
that we should ignore the State Plan’s plain terms and New Jersey regulations 
because this case may also involve questions of law.  Cf. Harrow, 279 F.3d at 
253–54.  Doing so would likely undermine the exhaustion requirement under the 
State Plan as many adverse benefit determinations are likely related to questions of 
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law.  Finally, Roche observes, without support, that claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty under ERISA need not be exhausted, and so, presumably, her claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty under New Jersey law need not be either.  Blue Br. 24–25.  
Even assuming that Roche’s analogy between ERISA and New Jersey law is 
accurate, Roche may not restyle her challenge to Aetna’s benefits determination as 
a fiduciary claim to avoid exhaustion under the State Plan.  See Harrow, 279 F.3d 
at 253 (“Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the exhaustion requirement by artfully 
pleading benefit claims as breach of fiduciary duty claims.”); see also Beaver v. 
Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 80 A.3d 1160, 1167–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2013) (rejecting inclusion of breach of fiduciary duty claims in complaint to avoid 
jurisdiction in New Jersey Superior Court and noting “Plaintiff cannot avoid 
[jurisdiction] by cloaking his claims under the mantle of contract and tort”). 
Roche last insists that the District Court abused its discretion in concluding 
that exhaustion would not be futile here.  We have held that “[a] plaintiff is 
excused from exhausting administrative procedures under ERISA if it would be 
futile to do so.”  Harrow, 279 F.3d at 249.  Although New Jersey courts appear to 
recognize this exception to administrative exhaustion as well, see L.W. v. Egg 
Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. A-0928-12T1, 2015 WL 1013164, at *4 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 10, 2015) (citing Harrow, 279 F.3d at 250), it is unclear 
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whether the futility exception would apply in light of clear language mandating 
exhaustion in both the State Plan and the New Jersey regulation.  Even assuming 
the futility exception applies here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that Roche failed to demonstrate the futility of exhaustion.   
To determine whether exhaustion would be futile, we consider a non-
exclusive list of factors:  
(1) whether plaintiff diligently pursued administrative relief; (2) 
whether plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking immediate judicial 
review under the circumstances; (3) existence of a fixed policy 
denying benefits; (4) failure of the insurance company to comply with 
its own internal administrative procedures; and (5) testimony of plan 
administrators that any administrative appeal was futile. 
Harrow, 279 F.3d at 250.  Roche has the burden of establishing futility.  See 
D’Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2002) (“A party invoking this 
exception must provide a clear and positive showing of futility before the District 
Court.” (citing Harrow, 279 F.3d at 249–50)); L.W., 2015 WL 1013164, at *4.  
The only factor weighing in Roche’s favor is Aetna’s lack of compliance with its 
procedures when it failed to provide Roche with notice of the State Plan’s appeal 
procedures.  The District Court reasonably determined that Aetna’s failure to do so 
does not overcome the other relevant factors, which all weigh in Aetna’s favor.  
Roche has not attempted to pursue administrative relief.  Instead, she sought 
judicial relief having made no meaningful attempt to respond to Rawlings’ letters 
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asserting Aetna’s right to recovery under the State Plan.  As noted earlier, she 
provides no evidence of a fixed Aetna policy denying reimbursement claims.  She 
similarly offers no testimony from an Aetna official regarding the futility of an 
appeal.  In sum, no abuse of discretion occurred here because Roche has not 
demonstrated that exhaustion would be futile.5  
V 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment and dismissal of Roche’s complaint without prejudice. 
                                                   
5 In passing, Roche argues the District Court erred in denying her request for 
discovery.  Blue Br. 29–30 (citing Roche v. Aetna Inc., 13-cv-3933, Doc. 35-3 
(D.N.J. September 20, 2013)).  We review the District Court’s decision for abuse 
of discretion, Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559 (3d Cir. 2015), and conclude 
that no abuse of discretion occurred.  In the District Court, Roche failed to identify 
with specificity what “particular information” she sought and, more importantly, 
“how, if disclosed, it would [have] preclude[d] summary judgment.”  Id. at 568.   
